Les priorités européennes pour le G20
Les membres du G20 devraient renforcer l’indépendance du Fonds monétaire international (FMI) pour lui permettre de faire office d’arbitre en vue de résoudre la crise financière. C’est ce qu’indique Daniel Gros, directeur du Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), sur VoxEU.org.
Les membres du G20 devraient renforcer l’indépendance du Fonds monétaire international (FMI) pour lui permettre de faire office d’arbitre en vue de résoudre la crise financière. C’est ce qu’indique Daniel Gros, directeur du Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), sur VoxEU.org.
« The failure of central banks to react to the rising bubbles was not due to a poorly designed global system, » argues the author. He says that the crisis « represented the dominant ideology over the last decade, which held that bubbles could be correctly diagnosed only after they burst, » an approach which he believes is now « totally discredited ».
Gros thinks it is unlikely that another bubble will emerge anytime soon, but concedes that 800 years of financial crises have taught us that « there will be another ».
For this reason, he argues that the global monetary system will need an organisation « which has the expertise to diagnose a bubble and the clout to make its voice heard, » making the case for the IMF to become the « world’s whistleblower ».
The first item on the agenda for reform of the G20, the author argues, should not only be « an extended remit for the IMF to look at financial market stability, but also a much higher degree of independence so that it can actually warn of dangers even if it is politically inconvenient for its major shareholders ».
The G20’s second priority should be to « match the reach of banks and supervisors, » Gros claims, adding that the massive failure of bank supervision « stemmed mainly from the fact that supervision remained national while the larger banks operated increasingly transnationally ».
Gros maintains that an « internationally integrated banking market is not compatible with exclusively national banking supervision ».
He concludes that Europe could be the major driving force for a reformed global monetary system but admits that « as long as the EU is not able to reform its own internal organisation, its contribution will remain minor ». Thus, European leaders should « get their own house in order » as a matter of urgency, he adds.