L’avenir contesté du Kosovo

Le principal obstacle à l’établissement du statut du Kosovo est que l’ONU, les Etats membres européens, les Etats-Unis et la Russie sont profondément divisés sur la question pour des raisons qui concernent de très loin le Kosovo même, comme l’écrit Paul Hockenos de Open Democracy.

The 16 November commentary states that « there is a general consensus in the international community that independence » is « inevitable » and « the best option for everyone involved », even Serbia. 

Hockenos believes that after eight years of running Kosovo, the UN « urgently wants to pack up and leave, regardless of [its] status ». He adds that « it is no wonder » that it wants to transfer power to the EU as soon as possible, describing the Kosovo mission as « one of [its] most expensive, worst administered missions ». 

Regarding US support for the Ahtisaari plan for « supervised independence », this has « less to do with noble principles of self-determination than it has with extracting the US from a remote, hopeless conflict », claims Hockenos – with the creation of a Kosovo state considered the best way to facilitate this. 

Similarly, the author believes that most EU member states supported the Ahtisaari plan « for reasons of calculated Realpolitik », highlighting the lack of EU support for statehood for other peoples such as Kurds, Basques, Ossetians, Chechens, Abkhaz and Tibetans. 

The EU supports Kosovo’s independence because its fate is critical to the stability of the whole region, claims Hockenos. He believes that any civic unrest or armed conflict in Kosovo would drag in Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania and « cause the EU to split again over a response ». 

Moreover, EU states such as Spain, Romania, Greece, Cyprus and Slovakia are reluctant to support Kosovo’s independence due to concerns over the intentions of their own minorities, Hockenos believes. Similarly, he claims Russia is « well aware of the precedent that recognising a breakaway region would set for far-flung and disenchanted national groups in its own sovereign territory. » 

Hockenos claims many Serbs « acknowledge that Serbia would benefit enormously from cutting loose Kosovo and concentrating on its own problems », but « saying this aloud in Serbia is treasonous ». 

He concludes that the Kosovo Albanians will not miss their opportunity for independence, but it remains to be seen what kind of statehood they will get. Without a UN seat or US help, « they could find themselves quite alone, carping that the great powers have left them in the lurch once again », he adds.