Kosovo : vers le statut final

Le temps est désormais compté au Kosovo. Le statu quo ne pourra pas
durer longtemps, affirme
ce rapport de l’International Crisis
Group. Soit 2005 verra un progrès
majeur permettant d’aboutir à un statut garantissant la paix
et le développement économique, soit le risque est grand que
le Kosovo retombe dans une situation de conflit et génère une forte
instabilité à l’échelle régionale.

As a first step, the six-nation Contact Group
should issue as soon as possible a statement spelling out a
timeline for the resolution of the status issue and four crucial
ground rules: that the protection of minority rights in Kosovo is
the issue on which progress will most depend and that neither
Kosovo’s return to Belgrade’s rule, nor its partition, nor any
possible unification of Kosovo with Albania or any neighbouring
state or territory will be supported. At the same time, a Special
Envoy should be appointed by the UN Secretary-General to begin
consultations on the content of a settlement accord and the process
by which it should be implemented. 

In mid-2005 the UN is due to assess the Kosovo
government’s commitment to democracy, good governance and human
rights standards. If the assessment is positive, the Special Envoy
should prepare a draft settlement text — the ‘Kosovo Accord’ —
and the details of an international conference to endorse
it. 

If Kosovo’s new government is to lead its people
to the independence destination they desire, there must be complete
respect and protection for Kosovo’s Serb and other minorities. The
Kosovo Assembly, with international assistance, must immediately
begin to draft a constitution, fully satisfying these concerns, the
text of which would, if accepted by the international conference,
form part of the proposed Kosovo Accord. Overall the object of the
Accord, together with the new constitution, would be to create the
conditions for acceptance of Kosovo as a full member of the
international community. 

It would be appropriate, given everything that
has happened in the past and the uncertainties about behaviour in
the future, for the Accord and constitution, between them, to set
some limits — important in content, but few in number and
relatively limited in scope — on an independent Kosovo’s freedom
of action, in particular: 

• Kosovo would be
  explicitly committed not to unify with Albania, or any neighbouring
  state or territory, other than in the context of EU
  integration; 
• there would be a
  number of internationally appointed judges in Kosovo’s superior
  courts, and certain international parties would have the standing
  to ensure that certain key matters relating to minority rights and
  other agreed obligations can be brought before those
  courts; 
• Kosovo would
  accommodate an international monitoring presence — the ‘Kosovo
  Monitoring Mission’ — to report to the wider international
  community and recommend appropriate measures if Kosovo were to
  backslide on its commitments. 

Before the end of 2005 the international
conference should take place, under UN chairmanship and attended by
representatives of the Contact Group members, the EU, Belgrade, and
Kosovo’s government and opposition parties. In early 2006, approval
of the constitution by Kosovo’s citizens in a referendum would
trigger the coming into effect of the Kosovo Accord. Desirably, to
give it complete legal as well as political effect, the Accord
would also be endorsed by the UN Security Council. Kosovo’s de jure
sovereignty, if not achieved by Serbian agreement or Security
Council resolution, should be recognised by the whole international
community, or at least such of its member states (including the
U.S. and EU members) as are prepared to do so. 

It has to be contemplated that Serbia — and
perhaps Russia as well ­– will refuse to cooperate with part or
all of this. But the proposed process should not be held hostage to
that eventuality: the situation on the ground in Kosovo is too
fragile, and the status quo too unsustainable in too many ways, for
the international community to allow its future status to be put on
indefinite hold. While legitimate Serbian concerns should be taken
fully into account, particularly about the status of Kosovo’s Serb
minority, Belgrade should be cautioned from the outset that « the
train is leaving, with or without you », and encouraged to
participate fully in achieving the best possible terms of
settlement. 

Complacency has guided policy on Kosovo for too
long. The potential for renewed violence is very real. The
international community, in particular the member states of the
Contact Group, must decide whether to regain control of the agenda
or allow matters to slip until unpleasant new facts are created on
the ground that they will have to deal with. The agenda set out
above requires political courage as well as energy. But the
alternative is worse. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

1.  As soon
as possible: 

(a)  The Contact Group
countries (highly desirably including Russia, but if necessary
without it), as a confidence and momentum building measure, should
issue a statement identifying a timeline for the resolution of the
status issue.

(b)  That statement should
make clear that the protection of minority rights in Kosovo is the
issue on which progress will most depend and that neither Kosovo’s
return to Belgrade rule nor its partition, nor any possible
unification of Kosovo with Albania will be supported.

(c)  The UN
Secretary-General, in consultation with the Contact Group, should
appoint a Special Envoy to begin consultations on the structure of
a final status process and the content of a draft
settlement. 

(d)  The Kosovo Assembly,
with support from international donors, should begin to draft a
constitution, including provisions for the protection of minority
rights and a number of internationally appointed judges in the
Supreme and Constitutional Courts.

(e)  The Kosovo
Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) should launch a
series of specific programs aimed at accommodating the Serb
minority, including a « Pristina – Open City » campaign.

2.  By
mid-summer 2005: The SRSG should conclude a review of the
PISG’s commitment to meeting standards — with subsequent steps
being premised on that review being positive. 

3.  By autumn
2005: 

(a)  The Kosovo Assembly
should finalise the text of the draft constitution. 

(b)  The Special Envoy
should produce a draft settlement text — the ‘Kosovo Accord’– and
the details of an international conference to endorse both it and
the Kosovo constitution. 

4.  By end
2005: The international conference should take place,
under UN chairmanship and attended by representatives of the
Contact Group members, EU, Belgrade, and Kosovo’s government and
opposition parties (or such of them as are prepared to do so), and
endorse the texts, as negotiated, of the Kosovo Accord and
constitution. 

5.  Early
2006: 

(a)  Kosovo should conduct
a referendum on its new constitution.

(b)  The Kosovo Accord
should be put to the UN Security Council for approval (with that
approval being a highly desirable, but not necessary, condition for
subsequent steps).

6.  Mid-2006: 

(a)  UNMIK should hand
over its executive functions to the Kosovo government and its
monitoring ones to a new international body (the ‘Kosovo Monitoring
Mission’). The continuing long-term role of KFOR, or a successor
mission, should be confirmed by an accord agreed between NATO and
Kosovo’s government.

(b)  To the extent this
has not already been achieved by Serbian agreement or Security
Council resolution, Kosovo’s de jure sovereignty should be
recognised by the international community, or such member states
(including the U.S. and EU members) as are prepared to do
so. 

To read the full text of the report, visit the International Crisis Group website.