Iouchtchenko, un "partenaire" ombrageux pour Moscou

Ioutchenko parle de « partenariat stratégique » à Moscou et de
« transformation irréversible » à Strasbourg, plaçant son
voisin russe dans une situation de frustration et
d’incertitude, souligne cet article publié
par Transitions Online.

The body language was awkward but the words placatory when
Viktor Yushchenko and Vladimir Putin met for the first time as
presidents. After an election campaign in which the Kremlin openly
backed Yushchenko’s opponent, both languages were important. So too
was the symbolism of Yushchenko’s decision to make Moscow his first
port of call in a whirlwind week that also took him to Auschwitz,
Strasbourg, and Davos, site of the World Economic Forum. 

Yushchenko called Russia “a permanent strategic partner of
Ukraine » and promised “to maintain continuity » in the relationship.
His predecessor, Leonid Kuchma, had taken several significant steps
towards Russia during his presidency, including signing Ukraine up
to Russia’s would-be answer to the European Union, the Single
Economic Area. For his part, Putin said, “I do not see a single
question that would elicit any misunderstanding or would create
conditions for any kind of difficulties on the path of our
cooperation. » Yushchenko echoed that sentiment, saying that  »I
think that we managed to turn over the pre-election page
completely, to close it.” 

Asking for an upgrade

But for all the words and symbolism, others were not so certain
that the page had been turned, preferring to read between the lines
of several other moves. On the day of Yushchenko’s inauguration, 23
January, Putin met Viktor Yanukovych, the man he backed for the
Ukrainian presidency. And on the day he met Putin, Yushchenko
appointed as acting prime minister the candidate most disliked by
the Kremlin – Yulia Tymoshenko. 

The timing of Tymoshenko’s appointment may have been determined
by other factors – Yushchenko had been inaugurated as president
just the day before – but it served to fuel Russian fears that
Ukraine’s relations with Moscow will be cooler than they were under
Kuchma. 

Further fuel was added to fears that Yushchenko’s Ukraine might
look more to Europe than to Russia during Yushchenko’s subsequent
visit to the Council of Europe. There, Yushchenko made clear
Ukraine’s European credentials (the Orange Revolution was a
demonstration that “European values have taken root in my people’s
mentality ») and Ukraine’s desire for European Union membership. He
pushed for a swift upgrade in relations, asking for enhanced
cooperation, looser travel restrictions, the creation of a
free-trade zone, and European support for Ukraine’s bid for
membership of the World Trade Organization. 

All of this was portrayed as complementary to Yushchenko’s
domestic program to « ensure the irreversibility of the
transformations in Ukraine. » 

Pressure for Europe to open its arms to Ukraine is mounting. On
13 January, the European Parliament called on Europe’s leaders to
offer Ukraine the prospect of membership. Poland, a champion of
Ukraine’s cause, is arguing that Ukraine should be put on the same
membership timeline as Turkey. 

The EU went some way to meeting such calls, announcing 10
initiatives aimed at, among other things, easing trade with Ukraine
and boosting investment. Already wary of Yushchenko before the
elections, Russia is clearly unhappy at the prospect of an
irreversible transformation of Ukraine and a geopolitical movement
westward. The head of the Russian Duma’s international-affairs
committee was unhappy. Konstantin Kosachev complained to Russian
journalists that Yushchenko had not mentioned Russia in his speech
in Strasbourg, “while mentioning Europe and the EU in every other
sentence of that speech. This rings an alarm bell. » 

Kosachev interpreted Yushchenko’s performance as a sign that he
« does not regard cooperation with Russia as a goal in itself, but
only as a factor that may or may not harm Ukraine’s integration
with Europe. » 

Yushchenko had earlier outlined three considerations that would
affect Ukraine’s attitude to Russia’s alternative to the EU, the
Single Economic Area. One was that Ukraine’s attempt to integrate
itself with the EU should not be affected. 

To read the article in full, visit the Transitions Online website.