Crise dans le Caucase du Sud : le grand moment de la Turquie ?
La crise entre la Géorgie et la Russie offre à la Turquie une occasion unique d’asseoir son autorité régionale, de réduire l’influence russe et iranienne et de contribuer à la protection des flux de pétrole et de gaz naturel à destination de l’Occident en provenance des anciens Etats soviétiques d’Asie centrale et d’Azerbaïdjan. C’est ce qu’indique Amberin Zaman dans une analyse d’août pour le German Marshall Fund of the United States.
La crise entre la Géorgie et la Russie offre à la Turquie une occasion unique d’asseoir son autorité régionale, de réduire l’influence russe et iranienne et de contribuer à la protection des flux de pétrole et de gaz naturel à destination de l’Occident en provenance des anciens Etats soviétiques d’Asie centrale et d’Azerbaïdjan. C’est ce qu’indique Amberin Zaman dans une analyse d’août pour le German Marshall Fund of the United States.
To this end, the ‘Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform’ proposed by Turkey in response to the post-war climate is « a step in the right direction, » according to The Economist’s Turkey correspondent.
But « one glaring hitch » is that the country does not have formal ties with Armenia, fears Zaman, while some have described the plan as « an empty gesture » which is « vague and lacking in substance » and designed to allow Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan « to burnish his credentials as a statesman and hog the international stage ».
Nevertheless, the author argues that the initiative could prove useful for improving Turkey-Armenia relations, which is « clearly in Turkey’s interests » despite « formidable diplomatic obstacles ».
Zaman believes the Georgian conflict has « starkly illuminated » the need for all the region’s players « to rethink the status quo ». For example, re-opening its railway to Armenia would help Turkey avert « a looming [humanitarian] crisis » in that country and allow aid to reach Georgia, she argues.
Ethnic and religious ties mean that Turkey’s foreign policy has long favoured Azerbaijan over Armenia, explains the author. Nevertheless, she claims there is « growing recognition in official circles that isolating Armenia is hurting Turkey without necessarily helping Azerbaijan ».
She asserts that « Turkish and Armenian diplomats have been holding secret talks » that « could lay the ground for re-establishing diplomatic ties » between the two countries, but warns that Turkey will require Armenia to stop backing its diaspora’s campaign for international genocide recognition and declare « that it has no territorial claims » on Turkish soil if this is to happen.
Ultimately, the views of Turkish army will have a decisive impact on the chances of any rapprochement with Armenia, concludes Zaman, who interprets their current silence as a good sign.