Comprendre l'Union pour la Méditerranée de Nicolas Sarkozy

Michael Emerson du Centre des Etudes politiques européennes (CEPS) considère l'initiative du président français Nicolas Sarkozy concernant la région méditerranéenne devrait être considérée comme une opportunité de rationaliser et de revitaliser les politiques actuelles de l’UE envers l’union méditerranéenne qui est pris dans un contexte léthargique. 

Michael Emerson du Centre des Etudes politiques européennes (CEPS) considère l’initiative du président français Nicolas Sarkozy concernant la région méditerranéenne devrait être considérée comme une opportunité de rationaliser et de revitaliser les politiques actuelles de l’UE envers l’union méditerranéenne qui est pris dans un contexte léthargique. 

The main explanation as to why the Barcelona Process – the predecessor to the new Union – has not delivered the desired results is not in its institutional architecture, but rather in the weak policy input from member states, both at bilateral and EU level, argues Emerson. 

The author also attributes the lack of progress to the Arab partner states’ « stubbornness » towards political and economic reforms. Moreover, he points out that, while only a few years ago, the South Mediterranean was not much poorer than Central and Eastern Europe, it « has now been left way behind » due to a policy of « benign neglect ». 

Emerson notably criticises the EU’s 2004 decision to treat all its bordering countries equally under the umbrella of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), be they from the Eastern or Southern branches. 

He says this classification completely overlooks the fact that the Arab Mediterranean states have very little in common with the states of the former Soviet Union in terms of geography, history, religion or culture. He thus believes greater differentiation is needed between these two branches of the neighbourhood policy. 

The EU also needs to address its « serious communication and credibility problem », which results from the « confusing complexity » of the different policy schemes put in place for the Mediterranean region, Emerson writes. 

He therefore calls upon the EU to rationalise and properly integrate the Barcelona Process into a single ‘European Mediterranean Policy’, under the umbrella of the new Union for the Mediterranean, rather than just adding the new Union on top of existing programmes. 

Moreover he adds, a better clarification of competences is needed between the EU institutions and its individual member states and some of the « heavy » EU procedures of the Barcelona process need to be « lightened ». 

One solution would be to make use of the ‘Open Troika’ method currently applied in the EU’s dealings with the Baltic or the Black Sea regions, he suggests. This method foresees that, in addition to the Presidency and the Commission, only the most seriously interested member states get involved in discussions with the regions, on a case by case-basis, instead of having the whole EU participating. 

The author concludes by identifying three strategic issues in relations with the regions, which he says have thus far been left out from the technical projects proposed despite being « inescapably matters of concern » for the EU: 

– Promoting democracy and human rights; 

– Stepping up the economic efforts and; 

– Addressing common security concerns, such as the threat from radical Islamic terrorism. 

« It is difficult to conceive any plan of strategic importance for the Mediterranean region without addressing these issues, » he concludes.